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 contemplation. In short, man is a rational animal.
 This assumption extends naturally to his aesthetics.
 In the Poetics, Aristotle takes an intellectualist
 approach to tragedy. Character is understood in terms
 of thought and thought in terms of the arguments
 offered. Spectacle is not even necessary; the play
 could just be read. Dissanayake would probably see
 Aristotle as one of those responsible for an overem-
 phasis on analysis in Western society. Yet analysis
 does play an important role in the making and appre-
 ciation of the arts. Our greatest works of art, for
 example, the Brothers Karamazov (which Dissanay-
 ake herself recognizes as of the highest quality),
 require equal concern for emotion and intellect. The
 analysis of such works by good critics often helps us
 to appreciate them better. Although arts that stress
 the communal and the rhythmic are of value (one of
 Dissanayake's rare examples from contemporary art
 is "Vulcano" [1995], an art project designed by
 Giusippe Gabellone in which the artist asked collabora-
 tors to carry out their work of constructing a volcano
 from wood and clay in total silence), they may not
 have the deep and enduring interest of works that
 draw on the intellect as well. Dissanayake recognizes
 that we live in a complex society, yet she sometimes
 fails to realize that we need art that meets our needs,
 which may be different from those of our primeval
 ancestors. Similarly, her criticism of Western culture
 as a whole seems inconsistent with her emphasis on
 adaptation. The development of a competitive spirit
 and a sense of personal identity may be especially
 adaptive to our own world. Still, she is probably right
 that much of the neuroses in our society is the result
 of ignoring our evolutionary roots. In the end, some
 sort of compromise is needed between the tendencies
 represented respectively by Aristotle and Dissanayake.
 We often talk about the value of interdisciplinary
 work but we seldom truly honor it. It is particularly
 good to get a long view of the arts, one that covers
 the entire span of human evolution as we know it,
 instead of just focusing on recent developments; and
 one that takes into consideration the human experi-
 ence as a whole and not just adult making and appre-
 ciation. Dissanayake provides us with all of that.
 Furthermore, it would be interesting now to see her
 theory developed in direct competition with contem-
 porary philosophical theories of art.
 THOMAS LEDDY
 Department of Philosophy
 San Jose State University
 POTHEN, PHILIP. Nietzsche and the Fate of Art.
 Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002, 235 pp., $79.95
 cloth, $29.95, paper.
 It is a critical commonplace that Nietzsche's thought
 manifests a strong commitment to the value of art.
 Indeed, it is often said that Nietzsche subscribes to
 some form of "aestheticism": it has, for instance,
 been claimed that, for Nietzsche, art provides not
 only the highest form of human experience but also
 the evaluative criteria in reference to which we
 should assess persons, actions, and the world. Thus
 understood, it is with reference to aesthetic value that
 Nietzsche conducts his famous revaluation of values;
 that is, his assessment of the value of our "moral"
 values. And while some authors have noted an
 ambivalence in Nietzsche's attitude toward art-in
 particular, in the works of his so-called positivist
 period of 1878 to 1881-the belief that art occupies a
 crucially important and privileged position in his
 thought has attained the status of near-orthodoxy.
 The major premise of the book under review is that
 this general consensus is mistaken. Rather, the
 author, Philip Pothen, claims that Nietzsche's works
 are marked by a "deep suspicion and at times
 hostility ... towards art and the artist" (p. 1). Pothen
 acknowledges the well-attested passion for art that
 Nietzsche displayed in his life, but insists that this
 must be distinguished from his philosophical
 objections to art as characterized by illusion and
 underpinned by a dissatisfaction with a reality born
 of psychological weakness. Yet the book ignores the
 apparent tension that this distinction generates,
 electing as its central aim to explore only Nietzsche's
 theoretical opposition to art and, in particular, to
 identify the philosophical arguments and positions
 upon which it is founded.
 Pothen's largely expository study begins with an
 examination of Nietzsche's first published work, The
 Birth of Tragedy-the text that is standardly taken as
 the ne plus ultra of Nietzsche's "valorization of art"
 (p. 8). This work, it is generally agreed, gives an
 account of the origins, and possible rebirth, of Attic
 tragedy in terms of the dual aesthetic principles of the
 Apollonian and the Dionysian. Pothen offers criti-
 cisms (not convincing to my mind) of this view,
 claiming that a close reading of The Birth of Tragedy
 in tandem with the unpublished Nachlass material of
 the period suggests that Nietzsche associates the
 Apollonian with "a problematic, perhaps even fatal
 Socratic notion of 'clarity' and reason" (p. 8). Even if
 we grant this claim, however, it is unclear how this is
 supposed to discredit the standard aestheticist reading
 of The Birth of Tragedy. According to this view, art
 achieves its highest significance when the Apollonian
 and the Dionysian form a synthesis in which the
 Dionysian predominates; but such a position is
 clearly compatible with the idea that Nietzsche was
 hostile to the Apollonian in isolation from the
 Dionysian. Pothen's remarks on this matter do per-
 haps point to a need to reevaluate Nietzsche's attitude
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 toward the purely Apollonian; but they fail to from depicting the artist as incapable of facing reality
 advance Pothen's wider claims in respect of the unadorned, Nietzsche's account of the psychology of
 inadequacies of the standard reading of The Birth of the tragic artist revolves around the idea that the
 Tragedy, or his primary thesis concerning Nietzsche's tragic artist is capable of confronting "the hard,
 supposed hostility to art in general. gruesome, malevolent and problematic aspects of
 By contrast, Chapter 2 offers an illuminating existence" (The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-
 account of the development of Nietzsche's thoughts Criticism," p. 1). Thus Nietzsche writes:
 on genius, particularly in the texts of 1877 to 1881.
 Pothen attributes to Nietzsche a naturalistic account The profundity of the tragic artist lies in this, that his
 of genius that is chiefly motivated by a desire to aesthetic instinct surveys the more remote consequences,
 revalue the basic assumption of theorists from Kant that he does not halt shortsightedly at what is closest at
 to Wagner that the genius is of a different type than hand, that he affirms the large-scale economy which justi-
 other merely talented artists. In this connection, fies the terrifying, the evil, the questionable-and more than
 Pothen considers Nietzsche's attempts to naturalize merely justifies them. (The Will to Power, p. 852)
 the "metaphysical vocabulary" (p. 47) that surrounds
 the concept of genius. For example, the notion of In the face of this passage and numerous others
 "inspiration" as the cause of great art is said to be an like it, it is difficult to see how Pothen can claim that
 idea "which artists have a vested interest in perpetu- Nietzsche associates art and artists in general with
 ating" (p. 47), but that in fact conceals the more illusion, and that this motivates his "consistent
 prosaic "organizational" and rational procedures that rejection of the artist" (p. 176). To the contrary, the
 give rise to artworks. Now while it cannot be denied "supreme affirmation" of the tragic artist is based on
 that Nietzsche seeks to repudiate the otherworldly an apprehension of reality that is "strictly confirmed
 conception of genius in favor of a naturalistic and maintained by truth and knowledge" (Ecce
 account, Pothen overstates his case when he claims Homo, V, 2); and far from rejecting this mode of
 that, according to Nietzsche, the genius is not of a awareness, Nietzsche places it at the very center of
 fundamentally different order from other human his concerns: "affirmation of life in its strangest and
 beings. For it is one of Nietzsche's most important sternest problems ... that is what I called Dionysian....
 and consistent claims that the artistic genius is an In this sense I have the right to understand myself as
 instance of what he calls the "higher" individual. the first tragic philosopher" (ibid.).
 Certainly, this notion is explicated in naturalistic One of the most interesting discussions in the book
 terms-specifically, in terms of the psychophysical examines Nietzsche's largely neglected ideas con-
 make-up of the individual-rather than terms involv- cerning what he calls "monological art"-that is, art
 ing metaphysical notions. But it remains clear that for no one but the artist. Pothen interprets this notion
 the artist possessed of genius, for Nietzsche, is to be as offering us a kind of evaluative criterion: great art
 sharply delineated from the mass of humanity. is that which eschews both the audience and its
 Later on, Pothen claims that Nietzsche's "most approbation in favor of "solitude," "forgetting," and
 urgent charge against the artwork in general" (p. 53) "inner strength" (p. 74). Ultimately, Pothen argues
 is that it denies the reality of becoming or change by that the concept of a monological work of art is
 positing fixed and stable "ideas." As such, Nietzsche unrealizable, if not incoherent, since "the very notion
 views art as preventing both the artist and the "recipi- of the work implies an element, at least, of publicness,
 ents of art" (p. 53) from viewing reality without the as well as, therefore, a fundamental acknowledge-
 comforts and consolations of metaphysical fictions. ment of otherness" (p. 96). But this latter claim, upon
 But in making this claim, Pothen overlooks the fact which Pothen's rejection of monological art rests, is
 that Nietzsche often praises art precisely because of merely asserted rather than deduced. Indeed, it is
 its capacity "to impose upon becoming the character unclear how one would argue for such a thesis, since
 of being"-an ability that he describes as "the there is no prima facie incoherence in the notion of a
 supreme will to power" (The Will to Power, p. 617). work of art that is intended for no one. Moreover,
 Such art, Nietzsche claims, can proceed from "grati- Pothen passes over some of the more pressing philo-
 tude and love" (The Will to Power, p. 846), and is sophical questions that arise in relation to this notion
 hence an affirmative art of "apotheosis" (ibid.) rather of monological art. How, for example, is such a prin-
 than escapism or flight from reality. In addition, ciple of valuation to be applied; and how are
 Pothen conflates a distinction Nietzsche draws genuinely monological works of art to be identified?
 between art that exhibits a desire for "being" and art These are questions to which neither Pothen nor
 that seeks to embrace becoming. Nietzsche gives this Nietzsche supply satisfactory answers.
 latter kind of art the term "Dionysian" and its In addition to these issues, the book contains a
 paradigm is provided by tragedy, which conveys "the challenging and rewarding discussion of the will to
 eternal joy of becoming" (Ecce Homo, V, 3). Far power and its relation to art. In particular, Pothen
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 fruitfully examines Heidegger's reading of "The Will
 to Power as Art," and its implication concerning the
 specificity of the artwork by making it reducible to
 the physiology with which it is said to be identical.
 Additionally, Pothen offers an account of Nietzsche's
 critique of Kantian disinterestedness and judgments
 of taste; and in the final chapter he considers the texts
 of the final year of Nietzsche's sane life, in which he
 mounts his most sustained attack on Wagner and "art
 in the age of decadence" (p. 10).
 Overall, Pothen's book fails to establish its central
 thesis, but in doing so it offers many thought-provoking
 and insightful discussions of themes in Nietzsche's
 aesthetics that are largely ignored in the literature.
 DANIEL CAME
 Faculty of Philosophy
 University of Oxford
 ZAK, ALBIN J. HI. The Poetics of Rock: Cutting Tracks,
 Making Records. University of California Press,
 2001, xvii + 259 pp., $48.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.
 Although recorded music has been with us for well
 over a hundred years, the field of music aesthetics
 has remained nearly silent concerning the ubiquity of
 recorded music. Yet interesting issues do arise. They
 arise not simply because so much music is recorded,
 but because so much music is conceived of, created
 as, and disseminated as recorded music. Albin J. Zak
 III argues that informed listeners understand that the
 resulting recordings (or "tracks" as Zak prefers) moot
 all reference to "musical reality" existing apart from
 the recordings themselves. The implicit goal of The
 Poetics of Rock is to position us to appreciate the
 richness of these sonic texts. The central chapters of
 the book do an excellent job in marshaling evidence
 appropriate to that aim. Despite its title, the book is
 less about rock music (undefined by Zak, but seem-
 ingly encompassing virtually all of popular music
 since Elvis Presley) than phonography, a topic identi-
 fied some fifteen years ago by Evan Eisenberg. Each
 step of the argument is illustrated by examples of
 rock music, most of them well known to those who
 would identify themselves as rock-music fans. I real-
 ize that some readers of this journal are interested in
 the aesthetics of music but not in anything having to
 do with rock music or popular music. For such readers,
 I will note that the first three chapters provide what
 is most important in Zak's argument. If nothing
 else, those chapters suggest that ears attuned to
 recorded popular music often possess an astounding
 refinement of taste when it comes to sonic textures,
 and such ears are attuned to real properties in the
 music when that music is understood as "material
 form" (p. 46).
 The book's plan is straightforward, with three
 distinct parts. Chapters 1 and 2 constitute the first
 part, an extended overview of the issues. The basic
 idea is that tracks are "musical works wrought in
 sound" (p. xiii). Created by recordists, working
 musicians who share a specific mode of musician-
 ship, tracks are musical works without being Platonic
 universals. Akin to Aristotle's substantial forms, they
 require material embodiment. Chapters 3 through 6
 develop the thesis that rock records are sonic texts in
 which every nuance of sound plays a role in the
 music's identity and meaning. Although Theodor
 Adorno is never mentioned by name, this second part
 might be approached as a critique of Adorno's
 opinion that popular music consists of the dregs of
 musical history. The third part consists of Chapter 7, a
 concluding essay that does not draw upon the previous
 argument so much as it offers Zak's reflections on
 standard questions about audience reception and work
 interpretation. Despite my sympathies with the overall
 project, I have strong reservations about Chapter 7.
 The book's title, The Poetics of Rock, suggests
 some debt to Aristotle. But Zak, a musicologist, is
 not drawing on Aristotle. He is alluding to writings
 on musical composition in the sixteenth through
 eighteenth centuries, where a title that included
 "poetics" indicated that any focus on craft was
 balanced by discussions of aesthetics and rhetoric. A
 crude summary of the idea would be that complexity
 of craft goes hand in hand with complexity of artistic
 gesture. But then it is incumbent upon the listener to
 understand what sort of craft is on display. Where
 Aristotle's Poetics argues that the power of Greek
 tragedy derives from six elements, with plot as its
 soul, Zak wants us to recognize the degree to which
 rock music makes a song and its performance a mere
 layer among other "compositional layers" in the
 finished rock track (p. 25). Just as it is a category
 mistake to treat Sophocles's Oedipus the King as a
 play emphasizing character development, it is a
 mistake to approach most rock recordings as formal
 constructs whose essences are independent of their
 material embodiments. Instead, rock tracks are
 complex in their specificity as material constructions.
 Our knowledge that "every nuance" of sound is
 subject to manipulation (p. 23) contributes to the
 track's subsequent reception and interpretation. But
 appreciating their materiality requires seeing
 recorded tracks as collaborative enterprises in which
 the contributions of engineers and producers are as
 significant as those of songwriters and performers.
 Those who recall Monroe C. Beardsley's approach
 to aesthetics as meta-criticism will see that Zak
 adopts a similar strategy. As with Beardsley's
 account of musical works as auditory designs with
 phenomenally objective features, Zak likewise offers
 an analysis in which local qualities produce regional
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